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 Communicating novel and conventional scientific
metaphors: a study of the development of the
metaphor of genetic code
Susanne Knudsen
Metaphors are more popular than ever in the study of scientific reasoning and
culture because of their innovative and generative powers. It is assumed, that
novel scientific metaphors become more clear and well-defined, as they
become more established and conventional within the relevant discourses.
But we still need empirical studies of the career of metaphors in scientific
discourse and of the communicative strategies identifying a given metaphor
as either novel or conventional. This paper presents a case study of the dis-
cursive development of the metaphor of “the genetic code” from the
introduction of the metaphor to its establishment as an entire network of
interrelated conventional metaphors. Not only do the strategies in commu-
nicating the metaphor change as the metaphor becomes more established
within the discourse, but the genres in which the metaphor is developed and
interpreted change too during the career of the metaphor. Whereas the
standard scientific article is central in experimentally researching and ex-
plaining the metaphor, a mixture of more popular scientific genres dominates
in the innovative conceptual development of the metaphor.
1. Introduction
Developing metaphors
Research in scientific reasoning and knowledge production has celebrated scientific meta-
phor and analogy for their innovative, problem-solving and generative powers (see among
others: Black, 1962; Hesse, 1966; Leatherdale, 1974; Knorr Cetina, 1981; Maasen, Mendel-
sohn and Weingart, 1995; Keller, 1995, 2000). Analogical or metaphorical reasoning
describes a process in which a given phenomenon is compared to another otherwise totally
unrelated phenomenon, and pictured as sharing central attributes or relations. In doing so, in
seeing for instance a specific phenomenon under research (for instance a particular type of
moving gene) in a different light (as hitchhikers) might bring different and even unexpected
aspects of the research object to the center of attention (certain genes may travel in the
genome by using other genes). Scho¨n (1963, 1995) calls this process a process of “seeing
as.” Whether the process is regarded as analogical or metaphorical depends on exactly how
unrelated the two compared phenomena are considered to be. The more literal the difference
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between the categories to which the compared phenomena belong, the more metaphorical
the comparison is considered to be.
The process is often set off by the researcher struggling to understand a given
phenomenon or set of data, and then suddenly seeing and being able to explain these data by
using a metaphor. Tauber and Chernyak (1991: 9) describe, for instance, how the
immunologist Elie Metchnikoff during observation of certain mobile cells suddenly was
struck by the idea that similar cells might “serve in the defense of the organism against
intruders.” Metchnikoff spent the next 25 years developing this theory of cells at war. The
construction of such a metaphor is innovative and generative in two ways: it generates new
insight, but it is also capable of generating additional metaphors (which then again can be
generative of even more insight and metaphors). In the end, the result might be a central
root-metaphor (Pepper, 1942) surrounded by a network of related metaphors.
Focusing mainly on these innovative generative aspects, the majority of the literature on
metaphors in science tends to disregard the study of the additional development of the
metaphors. Consequently, the subsequent hard and dirty work of testing, elaborating,
confirming, discharging, adjusting, combining, formulating, arguing, communicating and
establishing specific scientific metaphors is rarely considered, neither empirically nor in
detail. A general assumption is that an original metaphorical idea may start out as a
suggestive hypothetical interpretation of the data at hand, and then gradually be clarified
either within in the same article or by other researchers of the community. This process of
clarification and scrutinizing of the actual meaning and of the exact range of the metaphor is
twofold: the metaphor can be either explained experimentally or expanded conceptually.
A metaphor consists of three elements: (a) the topic, which is the phenomenon we want
to say something about, (b) the vehicle, which is the phenomenon we are using in doing so,
and (c) the specific and relevant instances of comparison taken place. In the metaphor
“hitchhiking genes,” the topic is the specific types of gene; the vehicle refers to the
hitchhiking activity. The specific instances of comparison between the two phenomena
could be “ability to move” and “ability to take others with you as you move” whereas
other instances like “risky behavior” are absent from the metaphor, though perhaps
theoretically possible.
In explaining the metaphor, the topic is studied scientifically and the specific relevant
instances are identified. In studying protein synthesis, which is the case in this article,
experimental testing of various kinds is the favored approach. By scrutinizing the metaphor
experimentally, it gradually becomes less of a hypothetical metaphorical idea and more of
an established concept with metaphorical origins. The meaning of such a conventional
metaphor will at some point be settled and almost literal, having identified the relevant
comparisons and disregarded the rest. Some conventional scientific metaphors even merge
with the original vehicle term. As a result, this term will have become polysemous and
simply included the former metaphorical reference into the definition of the term. Several
metaphors have in fact been used to describe this process of conventionalization: we talk
about “dead” metaphors, “frozen,” “crystallized” and “hardened” metaphors contrasting
“living,” “fluid” and “open” ones. Whichever terminology one prefers, they all depict
something flexible turned inflexible to describe how original ambiguity as to the scope and
exact meaning of the metaphor has been settled. In the present study, I use the distinction
either novel/conventional or open to interpretation/closed to interpretation.
Secondly, innovative scientific metaphors may be expanded conceptually by spinning
off more metaphors. For instance, the metaphor of “the genetic code” kicked off several
related metaphors such as “genetic translation,” “words,” “genetic reading,” “transcription,”
“making sense,” “making nonsense,” “dictionaries,” “libraries” and more (Knudsen, 1999).
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The metaphor immediately following the introduction of “the genetic code” was constructed
as an answer to the question: “In what way is protein synthesis a genetic code?” The answer
was: “It translates messages between nucleotides and amino acids.” The metaphor of the
genetic code became a root-metaphor and expanded from one single metaphor (“protein
synthesis is a code”) to an entire network of several interrelated metaphorical expressions.
“The career” (Gentner et al., 2001) of scientific metaphors in developing from single
and often hypothetical ideas to a network of related, conventional and well-defined
metaphors has rarely—if ever—been studied empirically. The concept of metaphor is used
not only to generate new understandings, but also to express these new insights (Black,
1962: 33) or in “giving voice to particular kinds of data” (Keller, 2000: 76). Consequently,
we still don’t know much about how the multiple, potential meanings (instances of
comparison) of a given metaphor are resolved and communicated. Though analogical and
metaphorical reasoning can be understood as cognitive and cultural processes, scientific
metaphors have to be transformed from ideas into language (though not necessarily
expressed figuratively) in order to be developed at all. To be communicated, negotiated and
conventionalized, they have to be used in actual texts. So, in studying metaphorical
development, textual analysis of the texts in which this development takes place seems a
sensible solution. However, there is a problem in doing so. Even though the exact meaning
(the specific instances of comparison) changes over time owing to explanation and extension
processes, the metaphorical expression is likely to remain the same. Somehow, the texts
must signal whether the metaphor is supposed to be understood as a figurative hypothesis or
a formerly figurative concept. This article presents the results of a study of the changing
form and usage of metaphors, using the root-metaphor of “the genetic code” as the case.
This metaphor was introduced in 1944 into the international molecular biological research
community in order to describe and understand the process of protein synthesis. About 20
years later, the code had been broken, and the open metaphor of the code had given rise to
a cluster or a network of more or less conventional metaphors. This study is focusing in
particular on the role of scientific and popular scientific genres in the development process,
and the changing strategies in communicating the developmental stage of the metaphors.
Communicating novel and conventional metaphors.
On the basis of studies of the cognitive process of understanding metaphors, Gentner et al.
(2001) introduce “the career of metaphor hypothesis,” indicating that the exact meaning of
novel metaphors is created through a process of actively aligning elements between a topic
and a vehicle. In contrast, the meaning of conventional metaphors is only associated with the
vehicle and no alignment process is necessary. So, if a scientist were to understand the novel
metaphor “genetic translation,” she would have to actively mix aspects of linguistic
translation with aspects of cellular activity in order to construct meaning. After years of
research, “genetic translation” would have settled terminologically, and the term “transla-
tion” would simply have acquired two separate conventional senses: linguistic translation
and genetic translation. So, as the metaphor grows more conventional, a shift in cognitive
processing strategies from comparison between domains to categorization within domains
takes place.
Furthermore, Gentner et al. find that novel metaphors are preferred in the form of
similes. People even tended to consider similes more metaphorical (that is more open and
suggestive) than traditionally expressed metaphors. This is probably because similes
explicitly identify an expression as figurative by including comparative words such as “like”
or “as.” The explicit inclusion of these words signals that an alignment process should take
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place. Correspondingly, conventional metaphors should invite the traditional metaphorical
form, because the meaning is pre-stored and well-known and constructing meaning no
longer relies on active alignment between categories. As a result, a research question of this
study concerns the metaphorical form, and whether novel and conventional metaphors might
be expressed by similes or metaphors.
Another research question concerns the text surrounding the metaphors. According to
relevance theory (see among others Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Wilson and Sperber, 2004),
readers are capable of employing several inference strategies when processing novel
concepts (metaphorical and non-metaphorical concepts alike) enabling them to comprehend
new or unexpected terms. Consequently, a reader of a scientific text will possess inference
strategies in order to be able to interpret novel metaphors in scientific discourse, even though
they are not pre-stored or otherwise established. This interpretation is not necessarily
identical with the one intended by the writer, but simply one that enables the reader to make
sense using the information available to her at the time. Since novel metaphors are in nature
open to interpretation, the writer might want to push the reader in the right direction by
incorporating some kind of ostensive stimulus; that is by adding textual markers attracting
attention and focus to the intended meaning. Successful scientific communication relies on
the intended meaning of concepts being communicated precisely, clearly and convincingly,
so when applying novel metaphors we might expect authors to provide the reader with help
in resolving—or reducing—the intended meaning of the metaphor.
However, the reader needs more than that. In line with relevance theory, Goddard
(2004) argues, that in order to fully comprehend a novel metaphor the reader will need some
form of broadly understood meta-linguistic awareness. In other words, in order to interpret
a novel metaphor as intended, the reader needs to be made aware of the fact that the
metaphor is indeed a metaphor. Explicitly identifying the metaphor as a metaphor would be
the most obvious and ostensive way of securing the reception of the metaphor, but
explanations and paraphrase might serve the same purpose. A conventional metaphor has
become part of the scientific lexicon of the article, and will no longer be in need of
additional ostensive stimuli in order to be comprehended as intended.
So, in identifying a given metaphor as either novel or conventional, it is relevant to
analyze the immediate linguistic contexts of the metaphor and the linguistic strategies used
to secure or anchor the intended meaning of the metaphors. These strategies will probably
change during the career of the metaphor in the sense that the ostensive stimuli used to
identify the metaphor as indeed a metaphor and the need to control or guide the
interpretation will gradually disappear.
2. The case study: material and method
The genetic code as a network of interrelated metaphorical expressions
Experimental and theoretical research in understanding the mechanism of protein synthesis
was taking form during the mid-1950s, and the mechanism was finally established in
about 1962. The metaphor of the genetic code is more precisely a network of related
metaphors all referring to “the code” as a central root-metaphor. Following the invention
of the metaphor, several other metaphors were generated in order to elaborate and clarify
the initial metaphor.
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Construction of text corpus
In order to study the development of the metaphor, I constructed a corpus consisting of the
most influential research articles in researching protein synthesis. Constructing the material
for this study proved to be something of a quilting process, and I applied three strategies in
piecing it together.
The Science Citation Index was searched in order to become acquainted with the size of
the field and to discover citation superstars (Harmon, 1992) within the field. Articles were
selected on the basis of their reference to protein synthesis or the genetic code in their titles
and abstracts. I included the non-figurative term “protein synthesis” as a search term,
because the possibility of code-related metaphors in these articles was considered high. The
first entrance in the Science Citation Index is 1944–1955, so we don’t have the exact data
before that. This search revealed only a few articles using metaphors related to the code
metaphor before 1960, but the number was growing rapidly, and the amount doubled from
the period 1960–1962 to the period 1963–1965. Articles containing the non-figurative term
“protein synthesis” in the title or abstract also increased dramatically from 1955 to 1965.
The number of articles published grew from 41 involved articles on average per year in the
late 1950s to an average of 181 articles per year in 1965.
A second strategy was needed to make sure the corpus included influential texts not
registered in the Science Citation Index. In doing so, I was dependent on works on the
history of science and biology (e.g. Olby, 1994; Cantor et al., 1990; Judson, 1979; Mayr,
1982; Gribbin, 1985; Kay, 1997, 2000). I also traced the references of these famous articles
referred to in these books. Both strategies revealed a number of texts and genres the Science
Citation Index could not account for such as chapters in books, lectures, review articles
published in anthologies and popular scientific texts.
Having identified the central and canonic texts of the development of protein
synthesis, I selected a corpus including only articles actually employing metaphors of the
genetic code somewhere in the text. Since the aim of this study was to understand how
novel and conventional metaphors are communicated and not how often these metaphors
are applied,the exact density of metaphors was not relevant. A total of 175 texts explicitly
using the metaphor and 1,006 articles referring to “protein synthesis” were collected as a
start (Table 1).
The final corpus was constructed from this collection of texts. Since the appearance of
the metaphor in the early texts was scarce, I included more or less all available texts from
the period, which amounted to one book from 1944 and 22 articles published between 1954
and 1960. After the breakthrough in late 1961, the metaphors became much more commonly
used, and I selected the 10 most cited texts published in 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965.
As a result, the corpus used in the analysis consists of a total of 70 articles and chapters.
Table 1. Metaphor references
Period References to the code
metaphor in title or abstract
References to protein
synthesis
1941–1945 0 0
1946–1950 0 1001951–1955 2
1956–1960 20 238
1961–1965 153 668
Total 175 1006
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When I began this study, I intended the corpus to include only specialist research
articles. The majority of the texts are just that, but to my surprise it turned out that very
influential texts in the development were not all standard research articles. Some of these
texts are genuine popular scientific texts intended for a larger audience (though still not
everyman), while others are non-experimental, theoretical or review articles published in
distinguished scientific journals such as Science, Nature, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences and Journal of Molecular Biology. Even though standard specialist
research articles are generally considered to be the primary genre of communicating novel
scientific ideas and research, more popular scientific genres apparently play a significant role
in scientific innovation as well. Schro¨dinger’s What is Life? is a unique, but excellent
example, because it succeeded in presenting protein synthesis as a puzzle, or a riddle to be
solved, while at the same time providing the tool for solving this biological problem: namely
physics. These popular and even textbookish texts are included in the corpus.
Analyzing metaphor
In identifying the metaphors of the texts I have applied Lynn Cameron’s definition of
metaphor:
A stretch of language in its discourse context is said to be a linguistic metaphor if it
contains a reference to a Topic domain by a Vehicle term (or terms) and there is
potentially an incongruity between the domain of the Vehicle term and the Topic
domain. (Cameron, 1999: 18)
This definition works very well in identifying metaphors in which the difference between the
vehicle term and the topic term is substantial. However, when this difference between
the terms is less substantial, it becomes more difficult to decide whether a given expression
counts as a metaphor or not. An example is the metaphor of “genetic information.” The idea
of a genetic code originates in the assumption that the organism, the cell and the DNA/RNA
contain “information” or “messages.” If “information” is categorized as a communicative or
linguistic phenomenon, the application of the term “information” in biology should be
considered metaphorical. But if “information” derives from information theory, it is defined
more generally as simply a sequence of things, and will be applicable to biology non-
figuratively. In this article, “genetic information” is classified as a metaphor, because several
early texts treated it as a metaphor in need of explanation and illustration, but we are talking
about a borderline case.
Cameron’s definition does not distinguish between the various linguistic forms, and
genuine metaphors, similes, quasi-similes, analogies, and personification all count as
metaphorical. Since this study focuses specifically on linguistic communicative strategies, I
will briefly introduce the types of metaphorical expressions, bearing in mind that demarca-
tions between these types in this list are actually quite fuzzy in real life:
Explicit metaphor A metaphorical expression explicitly identifying the vehicle with
the topic (the A is B-form. Example: “Protein synthesis is a
code”)
Implicit metaphor A metaphorical expression in which only the vehicle is present in
the text (the B-form. Example: “The code”)
Simile A metaphorical expression explicitly comparing the vehicle and
the topic stressing similarity (the A is like B-form. Example:
“Protein synthesis is like a code”)
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Quasi-simile A metaphorical expression more implicitly comparing the vehicle
and the topic stressing similarity, but using another connector
than “as” or “like” (A can be considered to be like B; A is called
B. Example: “Protein synthesis could be regarded as a code”)
The following study of texts falls into two parts. The first part presents the birth of the
metaphor between 1944 and 1954, as it was introduced into the discourse as a novel
metaphorical expression of an innovative and strongly suggestive idea. This section also
serves as a short introduction to central components of the metaphor network. The further
development of the metaphor falls into two stages. The first stage, between 1954 and 1960,
is the developing period in which the metaphor is researched, and the amount of involved
metaphors rises. The period between 1961 and 1965 was a period of establishment, in which
the meaning of the metaphor expressions settled and became conventional. The second part
of the analysis presents this process by comparing the strategies in communicating the
metaphors during these two periods.
3. The early years and the introduction of the metaphor of the code
The ideas of biological messages and of inheritance of such messages were born in the
nineteenth century, but the actual metaphor of the genetic code grew out of the context of
World War II and the Cold War and related practices and technologies such as cryptoanal-
ysis, decoding messages, the invention of early computers and the introduction of physics in
biology (Kay, 1997). Keller (1995: 81) points to the complex system of the telegraph and of
information transfer as the dominating images in most biological thought, contributing to the
dominating “discourse of information”:
In the 1950’s molecular biology underwent a striking discursive shift: it began to
represent itself as a communication science, allied to cybernetics, information theory
and computers. Through the introduction of terms such as information, feedback,
messages, codes, alphabet, words, instructions, texts, and programs, molecular biolo-
gists came to view organisms and molecules as information storage and retrieval
systems. Heredity came to be conceptualized as contemporary systems of communica-
tion, guidance, and control. This linguistic repertoire was absent from molecular
biology before the 1950s. (Kay, 1997: 25, emphasis in original)
The metaphor of the genetic code describing molecular biological processes was
published for the first time by the physicist Erwin Schro¨dinger in 1944 in his popular
scientific book What is Life?. Schro¨dinger presents the metaphor as an intriguing research
hypothesis or even a modern quest:
It is these chromosomes that contain in some kind of a code-script the entire pattern of
the individual’s future development and of its functioning in mature state. Every
complete set of chromosomes contains the full code; so there are as a rule, two copies
of the latter in the fertilized egg cell, which forms the earliest stage of the future
individual. (Schro¨dinger, 1944: 21)
Notice that both vehicle (code-script) and topic (the entire pattern of the individual’s future
development/chromosomes) are represented in the text, but the exact reference—the DNA—
was still unknown to Schro¨dinger at the time (though it was later argued that he really
should have known better (Pauling, 1987; Perutz, 1987)). The following passage extends the
metaphor by elaborating or pointing out the central attributes of the metaphor. The topic is
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now represented in the text as “the structure of the fibre,” and it is this idea of structure, that
seems to be the center of comparison between the code-script and the chromosome:
In calling the structure of the fibre a code-script, we mean that the all penetrating mind
. . . could tell from their structure whether the egg would develop, under suitable
conditions, into a black cock or into a speckled hen, into a fly or a maize plant, a
rhododendron, a beetle, a mouse or a woman. (Schro¨dinger, 1944: 21)
The metaphor is pointed out as metaphorical by ostensive signals, pointing to the fact that
the expressions are not intended as literal, and also pointing out how they should be
interpreted. In the previous example this is done by explicitly being tentative, vague or
suggestive: “in some kind of code-script”—and in the second by identifying the metaphor as
a name or a label signaled by the phrase: “In calling A for B . . .,” and subsequently
illustrating the metaphor. When the metaphor is repeated at the end of the chapter, these
ostensive signals are still used; in this case by explicitly defining the expression as figurative
(“a simile”) and by paraphrasing the metaphor:
But the term code-script is, of course, too narrow. The chromosome structures are at the
same time instrumental in bringing about the development, they foreshadow. They are
law-code and executive power – or, to use another simile, they are architect’s plan and
builder’s craft – in one. (Schro¨dinger, 1944: 22)
Since the structure of DNA had not been fully understood, the metaphor rested for a
decade until it was reinstated by another physicist, George Gamow (1954). Gamow
presented his version of a genetic code understood as a translational relationship between
DNA and protein. This idea was directly inspired by Watson and Crick’s model of DNA
published in 1953 promoting the structure of the DNA molecule as a long sequence of letters
containing genetic information (Watson and Crick, 1953). Gamow extended the original
code metaphor, by specifying the coding relation between DNA and protein as a relation
of translation:
Thus the hereditary properties of any given organism could be characterized by a long
number written in a four-digital system. On the other hand, the enzymes (proteins), the
composition of which must be completely determined by the deoxyribonucleic acid
molecule, are long peptide chains formed by about twenty different amino acids, and
can be considered as long “words” based on a 20-letter alphabet. Thus the question
arises about the way in which four-digital numbers can be translated into such words.
(Gamow, 1954: 318)
These novel metaphors (“a long number,” “long ‘words,’” “a 20-letter alphabet,” “can be
translated”) are identified and communicated as figurative in two ways: first by using the
form of a quasi-simile (“hereditary properties . . . could be characterized by a long number”
and “twenty different amino acids . . . can be considered as long ‘words’”) and second by
using inverted commas when talking about “words.” In a succeeding paper published in
1955, the metaphors and the strategies in communicating them as metaphors are repeated
almost verbatim.
The construction of metaphors during the early years is hypothetical, thus preceding
experimental evidence. Schro¨dinger and Gamow suggested experimentally unfounded
metaphors, but these metaphors seemed to be suggestive and inspirational anyway. This
developmental pattern of metaphors preceding experimental evidence exists in other cases
as well. Cyrus Levinthal wrote in 1959 about the idea of what was later to be known as
“cellular transcription” and “translation”: 
380 Public Understanding of Science 14 (4)
There is, as yet, no direct evidence that this model is correct, but it is interesting to note
that the adaptor hypothesis was made two years before there was any chemical
information on the attachment of amino acids to soluble RNA. (Levinthal, 1959: 250)
Experimental evidence, then, verifies, adjusts or challenges the metaphor. Gamow’s
metaphor of a translation mechanism between numbers and words caught on, but the
molecular biological details did not fit the chemical knowledge at the time. Protein synthesis
seemed to be a two-stage process rather than the one-stage process suggested by the
translation metaphor, and Gamow had to reconsider his metaphor of translation:
This negative result is presumably due to over-simplification of the original picture,
since it seems, indeed, that the transfer of information from chromosomes to enzymes is
a two-way process. First the information stored in DNA molecules are transmitted to the
molecules of RNA (Ribonucleic Acid) which move out into the cytoplasm of the cell
and form the so-called microsomes. (Gamow, 1955: 1)
The problem was not the metaphor as such, but whether DNA or RNA is the agent in
the translation. In yet another article from 1956, the metaphorical expression (vehicle) is
repeated, but the topic is re-interpreted. Consequently, the meaning of “translation” is re-
established as a process between DNA and something else (“elements”) which then again
determine the composition of the proteins (rather than describing one direct transformational
process between DNA and protein).
It seems that metaphors may be used in scientific discourse as hypotheses, but if they
are challenged by experimental data, the community refrains from using them. Even though
the reformulation might seem perfectly valid to outsiders, the metaphor does not appear in
the discourse before the two specific processes had been experimentally verified. Alter-
natively, when the relationship between DNA/RNA and proteins was discussed, the authors
would use less specific words such as: nucleic acids “manufacture” amino acids; the nucleic
acids of the template “correlate” to a corresponding protein; nucleic acids “determine” the
amino-acids; they have “a relation”; they have “interactions” or they “specify” the proteins.
These words replaced the metaphor of translation until 1961, when it was formally
reformulated as part of the larger code metaphorical network again along with the metaphor
of “genetic transcription.”
4. Developing scientific metaphor
From multiplicity to uniformity of genre
Research in the mechanism of protein synthesis between 1955 and 1960 was characterized
by construction of new theoretical ideas and concepts. Some of the most influential
metaphors were published during this period, but further development often stranded
because of lack of experimental evidence. “Working hypotheses are slowly taking shape, but
the experimental facts are few” seemed to be the verdict around 1958 (Chantrenne, 1958:
49). During this period the genres in which the metaphors appear fall into two categories,
existing side by side:
c Predominantly theoretical texts reviewing and interpreting the nature of the code
without actual presentation of original experiments (though the texts refer to experi-
mental research of others). This group includes more popular scientific genres.
c Standard experimental research articles reporting original research and experimentally
based biochemical methods and results.
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The status of the research as theoretical or tentative is highly emphasized in the articles,
and the proposed ideas, metaphors and mechanisms are often communicated with reserva-
tions and uncertainties, as in the following example:
Many of these ideas are highly speculative and should be thought of only as current
working hypotheses (or dogmas) which are being subjected to experimental tests . . .
It should be stressed, however, that there is no direct evidence in support of this
assumption, nor can a precise mechanism be formulated at present, which might explain
how the required bonds would be made. One only can speculate . . . (Levinthal,
1959: 249)
These texts reveal a high awareness of how strongly claims and conclusions can be
presented. Since the claims and ideas represented in these texts are theoretical and not
necessarily backed up by experimental research, the hypotheses and interpretations are weak
and tentative. Authors suggest that these theoretical considerations “may perhaps be of
significance” (Crick et al., 1957: 419), while identifying areas in need of further research.
The general aim of the texts of this first category is to explain and review current re-
search and to provide theoretical interpretation of experimental results. Consequently, the
proportion of metaphors used in these texts is rather high, and the metaphors are used to
express hypotheses. However, while modestly acknowledging gaps of knowledge, the texts
simultaneously shape the entire research field of protein synthesis by interpreting existing
research within a general framework of the genetic code and by explaining data and results
through the specific metaphors. These theoretical texts discuss several metaphors repeatedly,
thus representing the first step in the establishment of the network of metaphors of the
genetic code.
In relation to the theoretical interpretations and explanations, the second type of text
presents the experimental research. While the theoretical papers aim at explaining the entire
system by presenting several interrelated metaphorical expressions, the more standard
experimental articles have a much smaller scope, in the sense that they present specific
biochemical problems and experiments rather than ideas. In these texts, the metaphor of the
code is used as a point of reference or title indicating the wider perspective, relevance or
general implications of the specific experiments. Consequently, the application of actual
metaphors is restricted to a reference once or twice in the introductory or concluding
paragraph of the article.
After the breaking of the code in late 1961 (Jacob and Monod, 1961; Nirenberg and
Matthaei, 1961), the theoretical genre including popular scientific texts no longer played the
same role in seriously developing and interpreting the metaphorical framework. The frontier
had changed, and now basically chemical answers were needed. Thus, the genres in which
we find the metaphors of the genetic code change compared to the early years. The popular
scientific texts are no longer represented in the frontline of researching texts. This is not
because such popular texts do not exist, but because they no longer play the same role in the
conceptual development. Some of them are cited in experimental research, but not to
the degree they used to be.
With the exception of certain metaphors (such as “the messenger” and “messen-
gerRNA”), the textual pattern of metaphor application in specialist research articles during
this period remains more or less similar to the pattern in the early research articles. The
metaphors provide the frame of reference of the research and they set the scene, while the
biochemical experiments, methods and results represent the specific focus of the research.
Except for a few examples, the metaphors are still mainly used in the introductory and
the concluding sections of the articles, and the material/method and results sections are
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reserved for communicating more biochemical concepts and processes. This tendency grows
stronger over the years, and in 1965 code metaphors are exclusively used in introductions
and conclusions.
From two separated discourses to one integrated
During the early years, a metaphor would seldom appear in the texts unaccompanied. When
a metaphor was introduced, it was also explained or defined. This explanation could take
two forms: it might be explained biochemically or metaphorically or by a combination of the
two strategies. For instance, when Gamow introduced the generative metaphor “genetic
translation” explaining the kind of code protein synthesis could be said to be an example of,
he also introduced an entire metaphorical universe in which the metaphor of translation
would make sense. In the following example, you can see the process presented within a
metaphorical linguistic/communicative universe and in the parentheses the story you will
find has the same elements repeated in biochemical terms:
Mathematically, the problem reduces to finding a procedure by which a long number
written in a four digital system (four bases forming the molecules of nucleic acid) can
be translated in a unique way into a long word formed by twenty different letters
(twenty amino acids which form protein molecules). (Gamow, 1955: 1)
The same phenomenon is represented in two forms in the same text: a metaphorical and
a more literal form—except for the metaphor of “translation,” which cannot be paraphrased
in biochemical terms. So, the role of these other metaphors is to provide some form of
explanation or scaffolding for the central metaphor of “translation.” In other words; a
metaphorical and a biochemical discourse are represented simultaneously. Only the gen-
erative, irreplaceable metaphor of “translation” is part of both discourses, in the sense that
no other biochemical terms exists to represent the specific process.
The emergence of an extensive metaphorical universe in these early texts is particularly
interesting, because it means that the texts are filled with a lot of surplus, illustrative
metaphors merely providing scaffolding for the truly important and generative metaphors.
These scaffolding metaphors represent objects, while the generative theory-constructive
metaphors represent relations between the objects. The scaffolding metaphors are repre-
sented only to explain the central metaphor, since they could be replaced by molecular
biological terms. The metaphors of “digits,” “words” and “letters” are paraphraseable (as
“bases,” “amino acids” and “protein”). In contrast, the metaphor of “translation” is not.
This pattern of using scaffolding metaphors and two discourses is representative of the
early texts, but gradually the scaffolding metaphors disappear and the remaining ones
become more and more incorporated into the texts as implicit metaphors. From early 1962,
the metaphorical and the biochemical discourse have melted into one, in which the
metaphors of the code are fully integrated into the molecular biological discourse. After
1963, they are used as transparently as any other conventional and established scientific
concept—even in the introductory sections. The example below illustrates how metaphors
such as “genetic information,” “expressed,” “transcription”, “messengers,” “reading” and
“message” are fully incorporated into the text:
Genetic information in DNA is apparently expressed via transcription into RNA
messengers which in turn act as templates for protein synthesis. Thus, incorporation of
base analogues into messenger-RNA could lead to errors in the reading of the message
into an amino acid sequence. (Champe and Benzer, 1962: 532)
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In general, any form of explanation, paraphrase or just mentioning of the topic element
of these metaphors dies out. The vehicle and the topic of the metaphor may be represented
in the same sentence or paragraph, but they are not explicitly connected. The tendency of
implicitly paraphrasing the metaphors also decreases during the run of the period: in 1963
seven out of ten articles implicitly paraphrase one or two metaphors; in 1964 three
metaphors were implicitly paraphrased just once in the ten texts; and in 1965 it happens
only once.
Marking the metaphor as deviant
During the developing period, all references to code metaphors stand out from the rest of the
text by being marked as somehow different, being represented in either inverted commas or
italics or by explicit reference to them as indeed metaphors or metaphorical comparisons:
If quadruplets (“four letter words”) are similarly used, there are 27 good “words”
per code, clearly enough to encode all the amino acids that occur in proteins. (Beadle,
1960: 67)
As a possible reason for the fine dispersion of nonsense might be the provision of
“commas.” (Crick, 1959: 36)
We use the term “information” in the sense of a molecular specificity, that which
distinguishes one protein from another. (Gamow et al., 1956: 66)
This behavior may in some ways resemble the typical introduction of any kind of
disciplinary terminology in a text (metaphorical or not), but it is significantly different as
well. The general rule in highlighting relevant terminology prescribes highlighting when the
term is used for the first time in a text. In contrast, these metaphors are often highlighted
throughout the entire text during the period 1955 to 1960, while very rarely being
highlighted at all in later articles, not even in introductory sections. Following the period of
establishment of the metaphor, the marking the metaphor as deviant gradually changes.
After 1961 the amount of metaphors marked out as deviant from the literal, scientific
language decreases dramatically. In 1961 and 1962, metaphors are still marked out
occasionally, mainly because new metaphors are included into the metaphor network. In the
example below, you can see how the three established metaphors “translation,” “code” and
“dictionary” are not highlighted, while the metaphor “word” is.
The translation of a four-letter nucleotide code into a twenty-”word” amino acid
dictionary has been the subject of much speculation. (Matthaei et al., 1962: 666)
This article is rich in metaphors, but “word” is the only highlighted one. The unmarked
metaphors are established within the discourse at this point, while “word” has not become
established as a scientific concept. In this article the authors focus on the amino acid words
in particular, and the authors’ aim is to present experimental research concerning the nature
and specificity of these molecular words. In doing so, they are also re-defining the meta-
phor and particular types of amino acid words: the “nonsense” words:
Coding units which would not direct amino acids into protein will be called “nonsense
words”. Up to now, it has not been possible to determine directly whether the code
contains nonsense units. (Matthaei et al., 1962: 674)
In contrast, during the period 1963 to 1965 only six instances of inverted commas or
italics marking metaphors are found in the entire material. During this period, metaphors of
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the genetic code are not marked out as different in any way, indicating that they are now
established within the discourse. Notice in the examples below, how the metaphors
“message,” “encoded,” “readable” and “non-readable” are incorporated into the discourse:
. . . the molecular weight of the message could be related to the size of the polypeptide
chain which it encoded. (Staehlin et al., 1964: 264)
Such considerations suggest that the sequences CpUpU and CpUpC may be readable
internal codons for Leu-sRNA, but may be less efficient or nonreadable at a terminal
position. (Bernfield and Nirenberg, 1965: 483)
In articles particularly aiming at discussing the molecular reality of a particular metaphor,
the metaphor will in a few cases be highlighted, but in most cases it will not. However,
entirely new metaphors presenting novel, original, and unestablished metaphors relating to
the code are still highlighted in some form.
From similes to implicit metaphors
Using experimental data, Gentner et al. (2001) argued that similes were preferred over
explicit or implicit metaphors in processing novel metaphors. This pattern is reflected in
these articles as well, where similes and quasi-similes dominate the early texts. Here is an
example in which a (biochemical) sentence is explicitly compared to a linguistic sentence
and subsequently explained by using the comparative term “similar to.” The following
example illustrates a similar explicit comparison between difficulties in breaking a bio-
logical code and a military one. The authors suggest similarities between vehicle and topic,
but not total identification:
The sentence is similar to that existing in any language where sensible sentences like:
“Amino acids form proteins” or: “Read Alice in Wonderland” each containing 21
letters, represent only a negligible fraction of all possible sequences of the same length
formed by the letters of the alphabet. (Gamow et al, 1956: 40)
We face here difficulties similar to those encountered by an Armed Force’s Intelligence
Office trying to break an enemy code on the basis of a single message less than two
printed lines long. (Gamow et al, 1956: 40)
In the early texts, both topic and vehicle are represented together, and introductory
similes are often taken up later in the text in the form of implicit metaphors combined with
explanation or paraphrase. These various strategies of controlling the interpretation of the
metaphor by representing both topic and vehicle in the text indicate that the metaphors have
not yet become established within the discourse, much less become non-metaphorical
scientific concepts. In contrast, the almost exclusively preferred figurative form from 1962
and onwards is the implicit metaphor. Similes and quasi-similes are out of the picture.
Neither early nor later texts use standard explicit metaphors in which a vehicle and a
topic are identified with each other by the use of some form of the verb “to be.” The early
texts use none at all, and in the later texts only very few instances of explicit metaphors can
be found.
The authors have very good reasons for disregarding explicit metaphors. When dealing
with truly generative metaphors, a more appropriate, biochemical term simply does not
exist. No other term representing the process of biochemical translation, for instance, is
available (otherwise the metaphor wouldn’t be needed at all). In cases where such
expressions of the topic take place, it would be essentially untrue to postulate that for
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instance a word and a certain biochemical molecule were literally identical. Proteins are not
literally words, but they sometimes act as though they were—and the expression should be
able to communicate this difference. Cases in which an explicit metaphor might be useful
(for instance when introducing the metaphor of “biochemical words”) are resolved by the
use of a quasi-simile or an explained implicit metaphor. A popular strategy is to use an
implicit metaphor in one sentence and the non-metaphorical representation in the next. The
vehicle and the topic are then both represented within the same paragraph, but they are not
explicitly identified.
5. Conclusion and discussion
The role of popular scientific genres in generating innovative metaphors
During the period, the metaphor swings between needing biochemical and conceptual-
metaphorical clarification. It is interesting to note that a lot of the conceptual and
metaphorical development takes place in popular scientific genres and texts (such as popular
lectures, textbooks, review articles and popularizations) while the standard research articles
mainly deal with experimental clarification of the metaphor. The authors cite each other
independently of genre. Sometimes the scientists even publish within both genres, but the
two kinds of development of the metaphors are clearly divided between the two genres.
When the metaphor is represented in research articles, it is mainly setting the scene and thus
providing a theoretical frame of reference. This pattern remains, until the topic has been
sufficiently and experimentally identified and established. Then the metaphor is included in
the research article as a scientific concept, and here it probably remains as long as it serves
a scientific purpose.
The fact that metaphors enter the standard research article does not mean they were not
used in popular scientific texts. They certainly are, but following the establishment of
the metaphor within a restricted, experimental context, the popular genres no longer play the
same role as a scene for innovation. Whether this pattern is general for the application and
function of metaphors in scientific communication is difficult to say, but it would not be a
totally unlikely scenario. Creating and developing deeper and more structurally rich
metaphors takes a broader disciplinary perspective than what is usually involved in the more
focused presentation of research results in standard research articles. In order to take
the more universal perspective needed in creating and exploring a substantial metaphor, the
scientists need a genre in which a larger perspective would be in order and in which a larger
set of experimental results were to be interpreted and communicated. This situation is at
hand when writing textbooks, popular scientific articles or review articles, in which the
specific task is to identify central scientific narratives and to have the individual research
fragments make sense. Writing within these genres presents an ideal situation for the
creation of metaphor, as both the genre invites them and the writing specialist approaches
the task with a mind prepared for identifying the larger picture.
Communication of metaphoricity: from ostentation to invisibility
Novel and conventional metaphors are represented markedly differently in scientific articles.
Textual strategies in communicating metaphors change as the metaphors are being re-
searched experimentally and thus established into the discourse. Novel metaphors are much
more explicitly present in the texts as figurative; by being typographically marked out as
deviant, by being explicitly identified as figurative and/or by taking the form of simile thus
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clearly emphasizing comparison between two elements of two otherwise distinct categories.
In contrast, conventional metaphors are integrated into the biochemical discourse and as
such much more invisible as metaphors. Whereas novel metaphorical ideas are explained,
paraphrased metaphorically and biochemically, conventional metaphorical concepts are
explained biochemically, if they are explained at all. So, the more unprotected, unexplained
and integrated into the biochemical discourse the metaphors are, the more established and
conventional they will be. Simultaneously, this study finds that the less the need of
metaphorical scaffolding (surplus, illustrative metaphors), the more established the met-
aphors will be. When metaphors are new and tentative, unexplored and open to inter-
pretation, they are explained immediately.
The content of the articles grows ever more specific and biochemical in focus. Even
though conventional metaphors are fully integrated and allowed entrance to the experimental
research articles, their appearance is still primarily restricted to introductory and concluding
sections. They are mainly used to provide perspective and interpretation of the biochemical
processes researched in the articles. The experimental work is presented in a much more
biochemically detailed scale even when the author is researching processes such as
translation or transcription. The only noticeable exception is “the messenger” or “messen-
gerRNA” describing specific instances of RNA. In general, the amount of metaphors in the
articles decreases during the period of establishment. The same metaphor may be used
repeatedly in the later period, but the variety of metaphors in a given text is limited. The
scaffolding metaphors, frequently applied in the early texts, have disappeared, and only the
generative metaphors representing biochemical relations between objects remain.
Discussion: from metaphor to fact and back again?
Conventional and established metaphors may be polysemous, but are they also literal? Is the
creative power exhausted, has the metaphor lost its drive? Well, not necessarily, because this
conventionalization is only established within a specific scientific context and this literal
understanding is highly context-dependent. A newcomer to the specialized discourse of
molecular biology might still need a metaphorical interpretation of the term “translation”
initially, before gradually being socialized into the “proper” conventional interpretation and
use of the concept. To her, it might still be a metaphor. In this discussion section, I want to
put the developmental pattern of scientific metaphors into perspective by presenting two
situations in which an otherwise conventionalized metaphor might be re-opened as truly
metaphorical: in popular scientific texts and in texts in which the meaning of the metaphor
is challenged.
The present study revealed the central role of popular scientific texts in innovation and
theory-construction. The impact of these genres is gradually reduced following the experi-
mental back-up and conventionalization, but they do not stop using metaphors. These
metaphors, however, are used to communicate established ideas rather than generating ideas
and promoting a communal interpretation of the metaphors. A case study of the metaphor
usage in popular scientific texts from Scientific American following the establishment of the
metaphor network of the genetic code (Knudsen, 2003) illustrates how otherwise con-
ventionalized metaphors are presented in the texts as metaphors rather than established
concepts. The strategies in communicating these metaphors are almost identical with the
strategies used in suggesting a novel metaphor in a specialist context. Whereas the
conventional metaphors are invisible as metaphors in specialist scientific texts at the time,
the ones used in the more popular scientific texts are much more visible. They are clearly
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highlighted as strangers by using quotes and italics, and by a preference for using figurative
terms in the simile form.
Secondly, the popular texts apply many more metaphors than the specialist texts do.
One reason for this increase is the reappearance of the scaffolding metaphors such as
“letters” and “numbers,” “sentences” and “writing.” In contrast to the conventionalized
metaphors, these metaphors can be paraphrased and even replaced by non-metaphorical,
biological terms. An obvious reason for this state of affairs is that so many new metaphors
relating to the metaphor of the code have been constructed, and that the popular texts
are aiming at telling the entire story rather than a mere fragment. As in the early specialist
texts, the involved metaphors are introduced with reference to their function within an entire
metaphorical network. The following example illustrates how “the genetic code” is explained
by including related metaphors such as “dictionary,” “translate” and “language”:
The genetic code is not the message itself, but the “dictionary” used by the cell to
translate from the four-letter language of nucleic acid to the 20-letter language of
protein. The machinery of the cell can translate in one direction only: from nucleic acid
to protein but not from protein to nucleic acid. (Nirenberg, 1963: 80)
When otherwise conventional metaphors are transformed from one context to another,
their function changes simultaneously. Even though they look very much like novel and
generative metaphors, they are not, because at this place in time they can in fact be
paraphrased and replaced by biochemical terms. When the metaphor of “translation” was
introduced in 1954, it was catachrestic and unparaphraseable, because the biochemical
reality of the term had not been fully understood. “Translation” was a hypothesis, a tentative
explanation of what might take place in protein synthesis. In the mid-1960s the definition of
the term was clear. When these metaphors, established within a scientific context, are used
as if they were novel metaphors, it is because the role of the metaphors is pedagogical rather
than idea-generative. In this sense, the conventional and established metaphors are not
entirely literal and clear-cut, because their metaphorical history is still alive somewhere and
can be brought back and reused whenever the need for illustration of the processes of protein
synthesis is required. So, even though these metaphors have been established and con-
ventionalized for 40 years now, all the scaffolding, the illustrative metaphorical universe
with its “ words” and “sentences” still springs to mind when the metaphor is in need of
explanation—even today.
Established metaphors are also open for re-opening and re-interpretation, if, for
instance, new data put the content of the metaphor up for debate. This may describe certain
aspects of a more current debate on genetic information versus genetic communication, in
which it is debated whether genes are merely transferring information from the DNA/RNA
to proteins, or whether in some instances RNA is communicating new information to back
the DNA:
What has become more evident is that the spatial patterns that develop in embryos are
not to be understood in terms of gradients of positional information that are read or
interpreted by genes to give spatial patterns of gene transcripts and products which then
determine states of cell differentiation and morphogenesis. Such a picture is both far too
static and programmatic to fit the observations. (Goodwin, 1988: 151)
In the case of the genetic code, the attempts at re-interpreting the metaphors arise as a
result of inspiration from other disciplines. To the molecular biological scientist of the
twenty-first century, the original metaphor of the genetic code may be established almost
beyond recognition as a metaphor, because it has frozen in a particular position more or less
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since the mid-1960s. However, in other parts of biology—particularly in evolutionary
biology—the metaphors of “information,” “information flow” and “transcription” are re-
opened thus allowing the scientists to criticize and re-interpret or even discard the metaphor.
This debate also takes place in the same kinds of genres used to launch the genetic metaphor
in the first place: theoretical review articles, serious and learned non-experimental texts,
textbooks and anthologies not presenting original or previously unpublished research. The
strategies of communicating this process of re-opening are exactly the same as the ones used
during the original introduction of the metaphor into biological discourse. A common way
of questioning and thus expanding a closed metaphorical scientific concept is by identifying
it as “merely a metaphor.” Griffith (2001) cites S. Sakar for arguing:
. . . there is no clear notion of “information” in molecular biology. It is little more than
a metaphor that masquerades as a theoretical concept and . . . leads to a misleading
picture of possible explanations in molecular biology. (Griffith, 2001: 395)
In the scientific articles of the 1950s and 1960s neither the idea nor the implications of
biological “information” and “messages” were questioned. The metaphor was rarely
explained in context; it was merely accepted and applied as an implicit metaphor. So even
though the metaphor of “information” was clarified enough to be agreed on and closed, it
wasn’t debated or tested experimentally as much as the other metaphors were. In the excerpt
above, Sarkar re-opens the metaphor of information by using inverted commas and citing its
status as a metaphor rather than a scientific concept in order to criticize the validity of
metaphor. He is somewhat mistaken in his verdict, because the metaphor of information is
not necessarily misleading, because it is a metaphor, but this specific metaphor may no
longer be the best tool in our understanding of these cellular processes. As a tool, the
metaphor worked more than fine in the 1950s and 1960s in generating an understanding of
the function and mechanism of the genetic code. However, this tool may have become blunt
or the job may have changed. One of the things that definitely has changed is the surfacing
of experimental evidence from related biological disciplines, which points to processes not
accounted for or explained by the traditional understanding of these specific metaphors.
In order to re-interpret the metaphor, it needs to be opened first and to be identified as
indeed a metaphor:
Awareness of our use of metaphor provides an escape hatch from the prison house of
language, or at least lets us know how we are confined. Such awareness . . . enables
us to see the metaphoric in what is taken as literal, an act of unmasking . . . (Brown,
1976: 25)
Having re-identified the metaphor as a metaphor, the scientist can either discard the
metaphor because of its metaphoricity or because of it being an inaccurate one, or she can
repair and re-interpret the metaphor, thus providing the concept with new meaning. The
metaphor “information” is in fact referred to in some texts as an open metaphor, and this is
done by the use of inverted commas, the incorporation of similes and quasi-similes, and the
representation of both source and topic in the texts. Ho (1988) takes the debate a step further
by adding novel metaphors to the conceptual biological metaphor of genetic information.
The metaphor she adds takes the conceptual metaphor in a new direction, because they are
metaphors taken from human interaction and communication rather than information theory
and computer science:
This involves all sorts of processes in which the soma “talks” back to the germline as
part of the functional interactions between different levels within the organism or
between the organism and the external environment. I would include (a) the large-scale
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reverse transcription of processed RNA’s into DNA and reinsertion into the germline
genome; (b) the non-random changes in genomic DNA in certain environments which
can become stably inherited in subsequent generations; (c) biased gene conversion with
or without mRNA intermediate, which is based on hypothetical functional feedback to
the genomic DNA. (Ho, 1988: 134)
A metaphor is never just a metaphor after all. The very same expression holds different
status within the scientific discourse communities at different times, and this status or level
of metaphoricity is reflected in the use of genre and language. The texts clearly signal
whether the metaphors are considered to be novel and work-in-progress or whether they are
closed and conventionalized. In this sense, a conventional and established scientific
metaphor, almost a fact, not only may have originated as an open metaphor, but may be
transformed back into one again.
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